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“Briefly stated, [fair] use must be of a character that serves the copyright
objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without
excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Art challenges. It can challenge boundaries, challenge preconceived
notions in culture, and even challenge what is art. 2 Because art challenges, it can
be difficult to imagine how the structural boundaries, inherent in copyright law,
can effectively interact with art. And yet, copyright law must do so to fulfill its
ultimate purpose—to encourage the production of creative works, including
visual art, to benefit the general public.3
To achieve this goal, the current copyright regime assumes certain
considerations. First, there must be an author, and that author’s behavior can be
influenced to produce additional, original works. 4 Second, authors can be

1

Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110
(1990).

2

See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 814 (2005);
Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial
Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 93, 101 (1994);
Peter Margulies, Doubting Doubleness, and All That Jazz: Establishment
Critiques of Outsider Innovations in Music and Legal Thought, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1155, 1194 (1997); Zahr K. Said, Copyright’s Illogical Exclusion of
Conceptual Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335, 335 (2016); Rikki Sapolich, When
Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights Model of Copyright
Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 462 (2007); Brian Soucek,
Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 451 (2017); Enzo Robert, Can
We Limit Art? Should We (and Is It Even Possible To) Limit Art?, EPOCH MAG.
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://epochmagonline.com/can-we-limit-art-46f50e8da2be
[https://perma.cc/PG4M-PGMM].

3

See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814
(2001); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 249, 260–61 (1997).

4

See Lunney, supra note 3, at 888; see also Schaumann, supra note 3, at 260.
Some note that copyright is structured to focus “solely on qualities of the
work, not the identity or quality of the author.” See Hamilton, supra note 2,
at 103. While true with respect to determining what receives copyright
protection, it does not speak to how the incentive structure functions. When
contemplating an author outside of the employment setting, the incentive
structure, whether functional or not, assumes that someone must be
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incentivized to create more by having exclusive control over the most common
ways to profit economically from creative works: reproduction, creating
derivative works, publicly performing or displaying, and the like.5 Third, the law
is structured to not only incentivize creativity but to effectively deter infringement
through appropriate punishment. 6 Fourth, Congress has recognized that the
exclusive rights of a copyright owner, if stringently applied, could be used to
undermine the purpose of copyright protection by actually suppressing
creativity.7 Therefore, the scope of exclusive control must be balanced, which has
led to several safety valves, various measures intended to minimize such
suppressions.8 This final consideration requires careful attention to ensure that the
“exception” does not swallow the “rule” and vice versa. These safety valves often
utilize standards that guide behavior but allow flexibility to consider new
expressions and ideas. 9 For example, the scope of the fair use factors has evolved

encouraged into creating new works. Further, the Ninth Circuit made clear
that humans, not other animals, are the intended authors under our
copyright law. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 425–26 (9th Cir. 2018)
(finding no statutory standing under the Copyright Act for an animal to
sue).
5

See Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain
in Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1869–70 (2011); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).
Recent scholarship has questioned the efficacy of the incentive structure, but
the value may be in providing economic support to free artists’ time and
resources to create more works. See infra note 46.

6

See WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 164–65 (2012).

7

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citing
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)) (noting that Congress intended
§ 107 to reflect the extant judicial doctrine, which inserts flexibility into the
rigid copyright protection to avoid stifling creativity).

8

See Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985)
(stating “(1) the purpose and character of use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; [and] (4) the effect on the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work” as factors to be considered when
determining if a use was fair).

9

See, e.g., Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 372 (Fed. Cl. 1992) (citing
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 2.3.1.2 (1989))
(discussing how the line between copyright protected expression and
unprotected ideas must be drawn carefully).
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over the years to respond to challenges raised by new art forms, new technology,
or new ways to utilize copyright protected works. 10
However, these kinds of context-dependent, flexible inquiries come at a
cost to certainty and clarity, and the fair use doctrine has long been the subject of
criticism.11 For example, Judge Pierre N. Leval, now a Circuit Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote a highly influential source of
criticism intended to redress confusion and inconsistency in fair use. 12 Among
other things, Judge Level proposed that the first statutory fair use factor, the
purpose and character of use, should turn on evaluating the “transformative”
nature of the new work. 13 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court adopted Judge
Leval’s notion as at least one relevant consideration and described the
transformative inquiry as determining “whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message . . . .” 14 Contrary to Judge Leval’s intent,
however, transformativeness has created greater uncertainty. 15
The transformative inquiry, conceptualized in the context of written or
oral text, must be applied to visual art.16 And in particular, it must be applied to
one of the more recent forms—appropriation art. With its current incarnation
beginning around the late 1960s and early 1970s, 17 appropriation art has been
described as “borrow[ing] images from popular culture, advertising, the mass
media, other artists and elsewhere, and incorporat[ing] them into new works of
10

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448
(1984).

11

See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. N IMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05 (2020) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].

12

See Leval, supra note 1. Judge Leval noted that there was no consensus on the
meaning of fair use, and decisions seemed more likely to reflect intuitive
reactions to fact patterns rather than the application of consistent principles.
See id. at 1106–07.

13

See id. at 1111.

14

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal
citations omitted).

15

See infra Part II.

16

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012) (indicating that protection under the
Copyright Act applies to “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).

17

See Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155, 1155–58 (2013).
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art.”18 The very concept of appropriation art challenges the copyright regime in at
least two ways: the concept of authorship and, more importantly for this Article,
the extent of fair use. 19
Fair use allows certain works to avoid copyright infringement claims. 20
The argument that some appropriation art pieces are fair use is rooted in fair use’s
rich history. 21 However, over time, appropriation art cases have utilized
transformativeness to improperly expand the scope of fair use beyond prior,
necessary boundaries; accordingly, fair use has been strained either in a manner
that creates a new level of uncertainty as to its scope or that expands it to the point
where the “exception” has now swallowed the “rule.” 22 For example, “[t]o many
photographers, [the Second Circuit’s Cariou v. Prince decision finding the
appropriation of many photographs to be fair use] was akin to slapping a ‘Steal
This’ label on their work.” 23 This expansion unbalances consideration of the
competing interests captured by fair use: the copyright owners’ interests in
exclusive control with recognizing the secondary user’s First Amendment right to
free expression.24 Further, the Second Circuit has continued to apply this distorted
form of fair use to appropriation art cases, greatly favoring the appropriation
artist.25

18

William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).

19

See, e.g., Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and
Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (1992); infra Part III.

20

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).

21

See, e.g., infra Part III.

22

See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. Schaumann,
supra note 3, at 250–51 (arguing that artists should generally be privileged to
copy at will, which would allow appropriate tools for modern day, social
commentary, as long as the secondary work was not a competitive threat to
the original work).

23

Patricia Cohen, Photographers Band Together to Protect Work in ‘Fair Use’ Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/arts/design/photographers-bandtogether-to-protect-work-in-fair-use-cases.html [https://perma.cc/T7X9UQDJ].

24

See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 550–52 (2004).

25

See infra Part III.D.
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In many ways, the evolution of these appropriation art cases are the
canary in the coalmine—they warn of the potential for overly expansive fair use
application across the creative arts spectrum that could undermine expected
copyright rights. For example, the recent Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. ComicMix
decision, involving a mash-up of Star Trek and Dr. Seuss, reflects some
problematic aspects of transformativeness, 26 perhaps demonstrating analytical
creep from appropriation art cases to other creative works. 27 Addressing the
distortions in the appropriation art cases equally raises awareness of these
distortions in other fair use cases, particularly those involving purely visual arts. 28
There are at least three significant problems with the current state of fair
use. First, when assessing if a secondary user transformed the original work, courts
cannot utilize transformativeness as a nearly dispositive determination of fair
use. 29 As Judge Leval recognized, all factors should be weighed to balance all
interests at play in fair use. 30 Likewise, the Supreme Court has noted in other
contexts that presumptions in fair use must be rejected.31 This does not mean that
fair use should be precluded for all appropriation art (or any art based in critique)
without appropriate licenses. Rather, this Article advocates for a more balanced
approach that takes into account the interests of the original work’s copyright
owner, a secondary’s artist’s need to use a copyrighted work without obtaining a
license, and the ultimate goal of benefiting the public as captured by the copyright
incentive structure.
Second, courts assessing transformativeness have now begun to
determine the expression, meaning, or message of both the original work and the
appropriation art work—specifically, if the secondary work is sufficiently new,

26

See generally Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, 372 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D.
Cal. 2019).

27

Patrick Perkins, Senior Vice President & Chief Intellectual Prop. Counsel,
Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., Keynote Address at the Brigham Young
University Copyright and Trademark Symposium (Oct. 10, 2019).

28

See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.

29

See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.

30

Judge Leval suggested that it would be hard to find fair use without
transformativeness but not the reverse. Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (“The
existence of any identifiable transformative objective does not, however,
guarantee success in claiming fair use. The transformative justification must
overcome factors favoring the copyright owner.”).

31

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994)
(rejecting bright line rules rather than the careful weighing of factors).
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innovative, or presenting a new or different message than the original work.32 The
ambiguity inherent in interpreting visual art opens the door for other, potentially
less appropriate factors to influence the transformative assessment, such as the
appropriation artist’s reputation or known style.33 Courts may also fall afoul of
Justice Holmes’ long-standing prohibition: “[i]t would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations . . . .”34 In other words, it is not the
court’s role to determine what art is valuable and, therefore, what art should be
encouraged under copyright law for the benefit of the public. Moreover, as with
any communicative medium, allowing such determinations may result in
suppressing unpopular points of view or messages.35 Judging the value or worth
of art, or even interpreting the message of art, should not be in the court’s hands.
Third, the assessment of transformativeness is not only quite broad, but
by focusing on the art’s message, it actually discounts a different aspect of the
artist’s purpose and character of use.36 Consider the exemplary uses identified in 15
U.S.C. § 107’s introduction: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research.37 In each of these, as well as parody, the secondary user
must reference the original work in order to achieve some purpose. 38 At some
level, the assumption is that the original work added some unique value to the

32

Some courts have noted complexity in the interplay of derivative works with
fair use and transformativeness. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Professors
Peter S. Menell, Shyamkrishna Balganesh & David Nimmer in Support of
Petitioners at 11–12, Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, No. 19-55348
(9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2019). This Article will not significantly address the
derivative works issue.

33

See, e.g., Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 382 F.
Supp. 3d 312, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (in arguing that the work is
transformative, noting how the appropriation art is instantly recognizable as
a Warhol by style).

34

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see, e.g.,
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (referencing Justice Holmes’ statement when to
determine whether work is a parody).

35

See, e.g., Schaumann, supra note 3, at 261–62.

36

See infra Part IV.A.

37

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).

38

Infra Part IV.A.
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secondary work and was not, for example, fungible with other material.39 In other
words, the first factor should include assessing whether the secondary use is
simply lazy appropriation, 40 taken to “avoid the drudgery in working up
something fresh . . . .”41
At best, the current state of fair use in appropriation art is unclear, and at
worst, it seems to disproportionately favor a finding of fair use. 42 This Article
suggests a return to a more measured use of the transformative assessment in
visual art fair use analysis as well as a fungibility assessment. Part II of this Article
sets forth the relevant basic principles of the copyright regime, often developed in
the written context. Part III describes the world of appropriation art and its
interaction with copyright law to date. Part IV suggests how fair use can be
rebalanced, including adding a fungibility assessment by reference to purpose of
use and evaluating it as an objective assessment. By making these changes and
under the current utilitarian approach, courts will better be able to balance
protecting existing rights and allowing unlicensed fair use in order to encourage
new art for the public benefit.
II.

THE UNBALANCING OF FAIR USE

The Copyright Act is intended to “stimulate activity and progress in the
arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public.” 43 An author will receive
copyright rights as soon as an original work, with a modicum of creativity and
independent creation, is fixed in a tangible medium.44 The Act thereby utilizes an
39

See, e.g., Fungible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fungible [https://perma.cc/7M5U-FJ4Q] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2020).

40

Brammer v. Biolent Hues Prod., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014)).

41

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).

42

Donn Zaretsky, Déjà vu All Over Again, THE ART LAW BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016,
4:41 PM), http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/deja-vu-all-overagain.html [https://perma.cc/5QKC-SG6W] (“Nobody has any idea what’s
fair use and what’s not in the fine art context.”).

43

Leval, supra note 1, at 1107.

44

See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 345 (1991). There are many works that many may identify as art that do
not receive federal copyright rights. For example, an ever-changing and
ephemeral piece of art may not be sufficiently fixed, as required for
copyright protection, unless and until captured in a photograph (or perhaps
sketches). The lack of protection for unfixed works might be tied to the lack
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incentive theory, which gives certain, exclusive rights to the author that then allow
the artist to monetize any interest the public may have.45 While recent scholarship
has questioned the incentive theory, 46 its efficacy may be in allowing artists the
of long-term benefit to the public, the inability to circumscribe the exact
nature of the art, evidentiary concerns, or other considerations. See, e.g.,
Lydia Pallas Loren, Fixation as Notice in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 939,
959–60 (2016); Yoav Mazeh, Modifying Fixation: Why Fixed Works Need to be
Archived to Justify the Fixation Requirement, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 109, 118–22
(2009).
45

See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

46

See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27–28, 39, 53, 78–80 (2015) (questioning
the incentive theory based on interviews of intellectual property
stakeholders); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Excess Revisited, TEX. A&M
U.J. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2020), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468213 (discussing and building on his
book’s finding of no correlation between incentives and production of
more/better music); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process:
Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1999, 2000 (2011) (copyright’s ability to promote creativity may be
limited or even detrimental depending on if the copyright itself becomes the
motivating goal); Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 935, 960 (2015) (collecting several arguments questioning the incentive
story).
Professor Amy Adler specifically argues that, due to the nature of the
fine art market, authenticity matters more than control over multiple copies
or derivative works. Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 313, 322–23, 327–28, 330–42 (2018) (limited to visual art as
defined by VARA). There is a place for the incentive story, however, to the
extent that appropriation artists are incorporating original works that benefit
from having control, including photographs. Id. at 370–73. Further, while the
premise has appeal, the weight of authenticity seems likely to unfairly
benefit established artists to the detriment of the new or currently unpopular
regardless of the various works’ benefit to the public. Given that most fine
art artists make their money via a work’s first sale, establishing a reputation,
one that will not be usurped by an established artists, seems important for
the price of future works. Id. at 334. But see id. at 342–51 (arguing the art
market addresses via authenticity).
In fact, the incentive story may have power if considered more as a
reward system. See, e.g., Mandel, supra, at 2007–08, 2011 (indicating that
reward system “can increase intrinsic motivation and creativity” and noting
that intrinsically motivated work is more likely to produce more creative
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resources to spend more time on creating more art. Because it is the current,
dominant theory, this Article assumes the incentive theory applies.
While the regime is intended to encourage creativity, the stringent use of
copyright to preclude others from utilizing a work can actually chill the very
creativity that should be encouraged.47 In part, this issue is addressed by limiting
the scope of copyright protection, such as limiting copyright protection to a
particular expression of an idea rather than any expression of that idea. 48 Striking
the balance between what is idea and what is expression is a difficult dance. 49
However, the dividing line should be tied to the underlying purpose of
encouraging creativity.50
Likewise, the primary purpose of fair use is to allow flexibility to
effectuate the very purpose of copyright protection, which is to encourage

output). In other words, copyright rights probably do not inspire creativity,
but the ability to monetize, via exclusive control, give artists the time and
resources to pursue art in greater measure, creating more art than otherwise
feasible if artists must have a full time “day job” for economic support. See,
e.g., SILBEY, supra, at 44, 48–49 (noting how artists often have to work outside
of art for financial stability in jobs that allow the most time for creative
pursuits).
It is hard to consider the counterfactual, modern world where there are
no rights to provide economic support for artists. However, there is some
indicia that economic support can bolster the creative output of those who
are already in the creative realm. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Beyond Eureka:
What Creators Want (Freedom, Credit, and Audiences) and How Intellectual
Property Can Better Give it to Them (By Supporting, Sharing, Licensing, and
Attribution), 114 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2016) (citing Michela Giorcelli &
Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity: Evidence from Italian Operas (May
24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2505776 (describing how
quantity and quality of operas increased after copyright protection was
introduced in Italy).
47

See PATRY, supra note 6, at 164.

48

See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 2.03[D][1]; see also Kaplan v.
Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

49

See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co, 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456–61
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).

50

Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 372 (Fed. Cl. 1992) (citing GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 9, § 2.3.1.2 (1989)).
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creativity.51 Thus, in situations where asserting copyright might stifle creativity
rather than encourage it, the fair use doctrine is a primary mechanism to counter
that problem.52
Fair use began as a judicially constructed argument. Judge Joseph Story’s
seminal 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh, considering 319 letters of President
George Washington, provided the foundational principles that have evolved into
the present day’s fair use. 53 The 1976 Copyright Act codified these principles:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 54
The purposes identified are not exclusive nor are the factors.55 The fair use
statutory factors are also undefined in the statute aside from a reference to

51

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citing
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).

52

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1109–10.

53

Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45, 347–48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841),
with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use,
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 145–46 (2011).

54

17 U.S.C. § 107.

55

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78.

182

AIPLA Q.J.

Vol. 48:2

commercial nature or nonprofit educational purposes.56 Each factor is thus defined
only by interpretive court decisions.57
Of these factors, the scope of the second and third are relatively settled. 58
The fourth factor is commonly called “undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use.” 59 However, the evolution of the first factor in some recent
cases has called this into question, 60 indicating that some courts consider the first
factor to be nearly determinative.61
The first factor is the most multifaceted, most complicated, and most
concerning—along with the manner in which courts weigh each of the factors.
When considering the purpose and character of use, initially one may refer to the
list in § 107’s preamble: “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .” 62 This
nonexclusive list of purposes, however, is not the end of the inquiry nor does it
identify presumptively fair uses. 63 For example, the Supreme Court added parody
to the previously recognized categories because it can provide “social benefit by
shedding light on an earlier work and, in the process, creating a new one.” 64 One

56

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).

57

See generally Leval, supra note 1.

58

The second factor evaluates the infringed work to see where it likes on the
factual-creativity spectrum. See Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 563–64 (1985). The second factor can also weigh against fair use
if the infringed work is unpublished. See id. at 551–55, 564 (noting
commercial value in protecting the author’s right to control first publication
and exploit prepublications rights). The third factor assesses both the
quantity and quality of the work taken. See id. at 564–66.

59

Id. at 566; see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 13.05[A][4]. The
fourth factor considers what would happen to the copyright owner’s
potential markets if the infringer’s use were found to be fair use. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 568. It also calls for also assessing the benefit to the public if the
use is permitted and striking a balance between the two stakeholders. See 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 13.05[A][4].

60

See infra Part III.B.

61

See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705-06 (2d Cir. 2013).

62

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).

63

See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.

64

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–80.
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could say that parody is a type of comment or criticism. 65 But as with comment
and criticism,66 all parodies should not automatically or presumptively receive fair
use protection.67 The statutory language provides guidance but not a bright-line.
Courts have developed several additional considerations in analyzing the
first factor. For example, the Supreme Court noted in Sony Corporation of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that a commercial purpose is presumptively not fair
use whereas noncommercial use is presumptively fair use. 68 The Court later
clarified that utilizing commercial use as a bright-line test is incorrect—even a
presumption is inappropriate—and reiterated that it is simply a consideration for
the first fair use factor. 69 The commercial assessment should focus on “whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price.” 70 The Supreme Court has also identified the infringer’s
intent as relevant, specifically the infringer’s bad faith intent to supplant the value
of the copyrighted work. 71
However, the recent rise of transformativeness as a key consideration for
the first factor has deeply shifted the fair use landscape. Judge Leval proposed
transformativeness in his seminal article on fair use.72 He argued that the primary
consideration should be “whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is
transformative . . . [where] the secondary use adds value to the original—if the
quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings . . . .”73 Judge Leval
then became one of the earliest to apply transformativeness—albeit in finding its
opposite, reproductiveness.74 In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Judge Leval

65

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).

66

See, e.g., Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540
(1985) (finding no fair use even though the reprinted portions of President
Ford’s memoirs included why Ford pardoned Nixon).

67

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–81.

68

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984).

69

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–84.

70

See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.

71

See id. at 562–63.

72

Leval, supra note 1, at 1111–16.

73

Id. at 1111.

74

Judge Leval’s decision was the second case to apply transformativeness. The
first, citing to Judge Leval’s article, is Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758
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found no fair use when the defendant reproduced copyright protected articles
from scientific and technical journals in order to have easy access in the laboratory
and for the purposes of developing a personal library rather than relying on the
shared company’s library.75
Shortly after Judge Leval’s decision, the Supreme Court adopted
transformativeness in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 76 In Campbell, the Court
considered whether 2 Live Crew’s new song, which paired some raunchy and
shocking lyrics with some of the original Roy Orbison lyrics to “Oh, Pretty
Woman,” qualified for fair use.77 The Court’s decision not only cited Judge Leval’s
article and Judge Story’s seminal decision, but also paralleled Judge Leval’s
reasoning. 78 Specifically, the critical inquiry is “whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is ‘transformative.’” 79 This transformation would indicate
that the secondary work is more likely to further the goal of copyright law, which
is to promote new creative works. 80 The Court noted that “[a]lthough such
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of
copyright . . . is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works . . . .
[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
[considerations in the first fair use factor], like commercialism . . . .”81
Although the Campbell decision adopted transformativeness, it is
important to note that it was doing so in the factual context of a claimed parody. 82

F. Supp. 1522, 1530–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving book excerpts in course
packs).
75

See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1, 4–5, 11–15 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (even in finding it inapplicable
suggesting, in dicta, quite a lenient standard for transformativeness in a
scientific environment).

76

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1994).

77

Id. at 571–72 (explaining the suit between Campbell and Acuff-Rose Music).

78

Id. at 575–80.

79

Id. at 579.

80

See id. at 579 (explaining that the goal of copyright is furthered through
transformation).

81

Id.

82

See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–74 (1994).
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A parody must, by its nature, refer to and mimic the original work that it is
mocking.83 In contrast, a satirical piece, which uses the original author’s work to
comment on a societal issue, must find some justification because, presumably, the
satirist could have made his or her point without reference to the copyright
protected work. 84 Further, if the secondary work is a parody, its parodic nature
affects the other factors’ analyses. 85 Parodies mock creative works and need to
reference enough of the original for the public to recognize what is being parodied;
therefore, the Court narrowed the applicability and importance of the second and
third factors.86 As for the fourth factor, the Court rejected any argument that its
prior Sony decision created a presumption of market harm when the appropriation
was for commercial purposes.87 Such an assumption may be appropriate when the
use is merely reproductive; but a transformative use, such as parody, is less likely
to act as a market substitution and, therefore, is less likely to affect the market for
the original work.88 Ultimately finding that parodies are transformative because
they provide the social benefit of exploring the older work while creating a new
one, the Court indicated that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s song has a
strong argument for fair use. 89
The Court noted two additional points about the parodic nature of this
work and how it affected the transformation assessment. 90 First, the Court
cautioned that transformativeness should take on a substantially smaller role (or
perhaps none) in the first fair use factor analysis when the infringer is using the
original work “merely . . . to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up
something fresh . . . .“ 91 Second, the Court cautioned that parodies (and
presumably any transformative work) cannot be considered presumptively fair
use. 92 Rather, these works must be evaluated by looking at all of the fair use
83

See id. at 580–81 (explaining the different definitions of parody and how all
definitions involve imitating or mimicking).

84

See id. at 581 (citing to the dictionary’s definition of satire).

85

See id. at 586–92.

86

See id. at 586–89.

87

See id. at 590–91 (noting that Sony’s reasoning does not match the purposes
of copyright law).

88

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).

89

See id. at 594 (remanding for further facts regarding rap markets).

90

See id. at 578–80.

91

Id. at 580.

92

Id. at 578.
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factors,93 presumably in light of the underlying purpose of whether the fair use
would encourage or discourage creativity.
Transformativeness seems to require simply assessing if the raw material
of the original work have been transformed into something new. 94 In considering
seminal fair use cases and Judge Leval’s seminal article, the development of
transformativenss was entirely in the context of written or spoken text. 95 Judge
Leval followed a long tradition as Judge Story created his set of fair use factors in
the context of the written word, 96 and the prior essential fair use decisions that
involve comparing and assessing content have continued that trend, particularly
the few modern Supreme Court cases. 97 Judge Leval’s article itself was prompted
when the Second Circuit overturned two of his decisions involving written works
and was infused with references to written or verbal works.98
This context was critical in how Judge Leval conceptualized
transformativeness. Thus, for example, his initial description of

93

See id.

94

See, e.g., Leval, supra note 1, at 1111.

95

See, e.g., id. at 1111-16.

96

See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (explaining the
considerations the court used in making its fair use decision).

97

See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 207, 236–38 (1990) (evaluating the
spoken/written works in a derivative work of a film from a novel); Harper &
Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542, 549–69 (1985)
(considering a portion of President Ford’s unpublished memoir); Tushnet,
supra note 24, at 684–85, 710 (discussing the development of copyright issues
with Google books). Some cases involve technological advances that change
how consumers access a reproduction or remove and reproduce works aside
from their original context. The first modern Supreme Court case analyzing
the 1976 Act’s fair use statutory provision, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), falls within this category. The Court found
that home videotape recorders, which reproduce copyrighted television
content, are fair use by allowing for time shifting. See id. at 442–56. Such
cases do not require any interpretation of the first or second work and thus
fall outside the transformativeness concern discussed in this Article.

98

See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (involving an unauthorized biography of J.D.
Salinger including some of his letters); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt
& Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1497 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving an unauthorized biography of L. Ron Hubbard
that included quotations from Hubbard letters and journals).
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transformativeness was that the “use must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original. A
quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original
is unlikely to pass the test.” 99 His other case examples were all copyright cases
involving text. 100 For example, he discussed the need historians and journalists
have to use accurate quotes to not only convey information but also to support any
conclusions they may draw about a particular person, his or her positions, or his
or her behavior. 101 This discussion was solely in the context of scholarly
presentations or criticism rather than in the context of a secondary user that
created a competing product, and it also showed the power, and perhaps the
clarity, provided by text.102
In the context of visual arts, this may be more difficult than the scenarios
discussed by Judge Leval. For example, in evaluating passages taken from a
copyright protected work that was then incorporated into a biography, Judge
Leval criticized any approach where the second user’s biography as a whole was
assessed for transformativeness rather than assessing whether the individual
passages appropriated were used in a transformative sense.103
[A]lthough each biography overall served a useful, educational,
and instructive purpose . . . , some quotations . . . were not
justified by a strong transformative secondary objective. The
biographers took dazzling passages of the original writing
because they made good reading, not because such quotation was
vital to demonstrate an objective of the biographers.104
In contrast to the suggested piecemeal assessment of text, consider whether it
would be feasible to disaggregate a complex (or even relatively simple) piece of
visual art. For example, in some works in the Cariou v. Prince dispute, Richard
Prince used only part of Cariou’s images or painted over Cariou’s photographs

99

Leval, supra note 1, at 1110 (emphasis added).

100

See, e.g., id. at 1112–16 (citing to other cases such as biographies Stravinsky or
Salinger).

101

See, e.g., id. at 1115 (explaining that an author of a biography had to rewrite
his book with quotes and then was subsequently was criticized with not
accurately giving the correct information and changing the story).

102

See, e.g., id. at 1111–16.

103

See, e.g., id. at 1112–13.

104

Id. at 1112.
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and included other images. 105 If one were to disassemble Prince’s works, then
Cariou’s photographs may be returned to nearly their original condition–would
that preclude a finding of transformativeness? Should one have to remove
Cariou’s photographs and see what remained of Prince’s artwork to see if the
message was transformative? Or should one only assess the aspects of the painting
that gave context to the appropriated photographs, which of course leads to
arguments regarding what created the context other than the whole piece? 106 No,
the only way to assess the secondary work’s message would be to look at the piece
as a whole, which suggests that assessing visual art for transformativeness is quite
difficult and different from assessing textual works. 107
III.

APPROPRIATION ART: ONE PERSON’S TREASURE IS ANOTHER PERSON’S
TREASURE

Appropriation art has been defined as “a post-modern technique using
images fundamental to a culture (and therefore not created by the artist . . . ) to
make a point about that culture.”108 Appropriation art uses common images with
the intent of changing the viewer’s perception of or perspective on those images. 109
In the art world, such appropriation is seen as “simply a technique or method of
working . . . [that acts as] the vehicle for a variety of viewpoints about
contemporary society, both celebratory and critical.”110

105

See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013).

106

One may want to consider the appropriated work in the context of an entire
show, if applicable.

107

See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, No Comment: Will Cariou v. Prince Alter
Copyright Judges’ Taste in Art?, 5 IP THEORY 19, 32 (2015) (explaining that
when audiences view artwork they look at the entire artwork as a whole
instead of individual pieces); Subotnik, supra note 46, at 970 (explaining that
visual works have the same characteristics a textual works).

108

Schaumann, supra note 3, at 252.

109

Eric D. Gorman, Appropriate Testing and Resolution: How to Determine Whether
Appropriation Art is Transformative “Fair Use” or Merely an Unauthorized
Derivative?, 43. ST. MARY’S L.J. 289, 290 (2012).

110

See, e.g., Appropriation (Arts), LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2013003220.html
[https://perma.cc/AQU9-V2TL] (“Like collage, appropriation is simply a
technique or a method of working. As such, it is the vehicle for a variety of
viewpoints about contemporary society, both celebratory and critical.”).
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To a certain degree, the name appropriation art is ironic as courts often
refer to the second step of copyright infringement as improper appropriation.111
By its very nature, appropriation art challenges what it means to have originality
and authorship in art and the mechanism by which the Copyright Act protects
creative works. 112 Appropriation art is particularly difficult when an artist
incorporates a copyright protected work of another artist “without permission or
payment.”113 In recent cases, the real question is whether the appropriation artist
can establish that her use falls within the fair use defense. 114 Over the years, courts
have changed how it applies fair use to appropriation art—in a manner that first
reflected and then exceeded the general loosening of fair use standards in
copyright.115 Although appropriation art is a unique form of copyrighted works,
its fair use analysis may foreshadow an even greater loosening in fair use writ
large.
A.

EARLY APPROPRIATION ART CASE(S)

The earliest appropriation art case reflected a more limited view of fair
use. It involved Jeff Koons, a successful American artist who worked primarily in
the sculpture media.116 In the context of complying with copyright laws, Koons
made a telling statement: “I am really very interested in the exercising of freedom.
The freedom of an artist to absolutely experience enlightenment and total
consciousness. Absolute freedom.” 117 Presumably, that included the freedom to
appropriate others’ art to utilize as raw materials for new works.

111

See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 464 (2d Cir. 1946).

112

See Greenberg, supra note 19.

113

Hamilton, supra note 2, at 95.

114

See infra Part III.C.

115

See infra Parts III.A–C.

116

See, e.g., Kelly Devine Thomas, The Selling of Jeff Koons, ARTNEWS (May 1,
2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.artnews.com/art-news/news/the-selling-ofjeff-koons-116 [https://perma.cc/EX9T-6LT3].

117

Ken Miller, Q. & A.: Jeff Koons on His New Champagne-Filled Balloon Sculpture
and the DNA of Art History, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAGAZINE (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/q-a-jeff-koons-on-his-newchampagne-filled-balloon-sculpture-and-the-dna-of-art-history
[https://perma.cc/9SRZ-C885].
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In 1992, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, Art Rogers sued
Koons for creating an unlicensed, derivative work.118 Rogers was commissioned to
photograph eight new German Shepard puppies and made numerous creative
judgments in its staging, including adding in the owners. 119 The photograph
subsequently was licensed for reproduction as notecards and postcards, which
was how Koons acquired his copy. 120 Koons created a sculpture based on the
photograph for his exhibit entitled Banality Show.121 While Koons wanted to keep
the sculpture as identical as possible to the original poses, he then altered Rogers’
expression in certain ways—for example, by adding flowers around the figures
and enlarging the dogs’ noses—likely to exacerbate the “banality” in the
photograph.122
Under the standards of the time and reflecting what may have been
common expectations about its limits,123 Koons was unsuccessful in claiming fair
use. 124 Applying the first factor, the Second Circuit was influenced by strong
evidence of Koons’ bad faith; he saw and removed a copyright notice on the
photograph before sending the photograph for use in fabricating the statue. 125 The
Second Circuit also focused on the commercial aspect of Koons’ work as significant
although the court did reinforce that the question was “whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.” 126 Finally, the court rejected Koons’ argument that his work was a
118

See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 301 (2d Cir. 1992).

119

Id. at 304.

120

Id. at 304–05.

121

Id.

122

See id. at 308.

123

For example, in the Journal of the Copyright Society, Professor Marci Hamilton
published an article based on a paper presented at the 1994 Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting. Hamilton, supra note 2. She argued
that we should not allow for free appropriation of art any more than we
provide “free canvas, paints[,] or brushes to make sure artists paint in the
service of promoting the arts . . . .” Id. at 110 (recognizing that a small
portion of appropriation art may fall within fair use, but only a limited
amount). Noting that effectively setting the market value at zero is extreme,
Professor Hamilton rejects fair use as an extreme solution. See id.

124

See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992).

125

See id. at 309.

126

See id. (citing Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985)).
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parody.127 The court stated that an artist can copy another’s work under parody
only when the general public can make that connection, either because the
underlying work was well known or because the parodist acknowledged the
original’s existence in some way in the work.128 Without having a parodic nature,
there was no need to conjure up the original work.129 In this case, the sculpture
may have critiqued the banality of modern life (satire), but the court found that it
was not pointedly critiquing the original photograph sufficiently for the first fair
use factor.130
The Second Circuit assessed the other three statutory fair use factors and
concluded that they did not fall in Koons’ favor.131 In particular, the court noted
that the fourth factor, market effect, is widely deemed to be the most important.132
However, as this decision occurred before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose, the court placed undue emphasis on the commercial nature of Koons’
work, as assessed in the first factor.133 The presumption against fair use, because
of his commercial use, coupled with the impact on Rogers’s potential market for
derivative works from his photograph, led the court to find that this factor also
weighed against fair use. 134 Interestingly, Rogers was not required to show that he
previously had exploited the derivative works market for his photograph or
intended to do so, nor that he had done so for other photographs in the past.135
Koons was sued twice more for other appropriation art works that he produced
for the same Banality Show; he lost on the same arguments in both cases.136

127

Id. at 309–10.

128

See id. at 310.

129

See id.

130

See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).

131

See id. at 310–12.

132

See id. at 311 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990)).

133

See id. at 312.

134

See id.

135

See id.

136

See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (containing a near-identical set of facts to Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons,
817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding similar results to Rogers v. Koons,
involving allegations that Koons infringed a copyright on Odie, the dog
character in the Garfield comic strip).
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TRANSFORMATIVENESS BEGINS TO CHANGE THE FAIR USE ANALYSIS
FOR APPROPRIATION ART

The second significant Koons case led to a decidedly different result. 137 In
2006 and after the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, Andrea Blanch, a
photographer, sued Koons based on his collage, titled Niagara, for his EasyfunEthereal collection. 138 Koons had cut out photographs of women’s legs,
repositioned them to point downward, and placed them over a grassy field,
Niagara Falls, and various confections so that the legs hung approximately twothirds of the way down the overall piece. 139 Koons’ stated intent was to
recontextualize and “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic
appetites–for food, play, and sex–are mediated by popular images.” 140 Koons
obtained one of the leg images from a highly stylized Andrea Blanch photograph
for a fashion magazine; Koons stated that he chose Blanch’s photograph because
it was so representative of a certain type of woman in advertisements. 141
Unlike Rogers, this use by Koons was deemed fair use. 142 Reiterating the
Supreme Court’s mandate to avoid bright-line rules, the Second Circuit began its
analysis of the purpose and character of the use with transformativeness,
identifying it as the heart of the fair use breathing space. 143 To determine
transformativeness, the court looked to both artists’ stated intentions for their
respective pieces.144 Further, the court found the image was transformed because
Koons used a fashion magazine photograph to comment on the social ills of mass
media and concluded that his adaptation in coloration, background, medium, size,

137

See generally Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).

138

See id. at 247.

139

See id.

140

Id.

141

See id. at 248.

142

See id. at 259; see also Farley, supra note 107, at 267–68 (attributing the ruling
in Blanch to Koons engaging in a more in depth discussion of art and his
artistic intent rather than the court’s application of the Supreme Court’s
Campbell decision).

143

See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Davis v. Gap, Inc.
246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001)).

144

See id. at 252 (comparing Koons’s interest in engaging the viewer to think
about the objects, products, and images and how they affect lives and
Blanch’s intent to convey an erotic sense).
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and details as well as purpose and meaning “almost perfectly” fit the test for
transformativeness.145
Unlike later courts, the court here separately considered the parody/satire
question.146 The court found that the work was satire, a generalized social critique
rather than parody, one expressly pointed at the specific original work. 147
Addressing the fact that the Campbell court appeared to apply a preference for
parody, the court here found satire sufficient because there was no way to engage
in the overall social critique of mass media without utilizing images from the mass
media.148 Further, the court leaned on Justice Holmes’ prohibition against judging
the value or worth of art; thus, the court did not assess whether Koons had “a
genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s image, rather than using it ‘to
get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.’” 149 Because
judges should not judge art, the court deferred to the artist’s stated intentions in
deciding if the work was transformative.150
The court, however, did not ignore other considerations within the first
fair use factor; it also examined commercial use and bad faith. 151 However, the
court’s finding of transformativeness led the court to severely discount the
commercial use consideration even though Koons made a large profit.152 Although
not present here, the court also questioned whether bad faith should still be a
consideration in the first factor. 153 Therefore, the first fair use factor analysis
became almost exclusively about the transformative test, irrespective of parody or
satire status, and utilizing the artists’ intentions as the key determination of
whether the original work was transformed. 154
The court assessed the other three fair use factors, and they led the court
to find fair use.155 However, the decision also demonstrated analytical creep from

145

See id. at 253.

146

See id. at 251–55; infra Parts III.C–D.

147

See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255.

148

See id.

149

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006).

150

See id.

151

See id. at 253–54, 256.

152

See id. at 253–54.

153

See id. at 255–56.

154

See id. at 251–53, 254–55.

155

See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256–58 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Campbell’s parody context to all transformative uses, despite its earlier analytical
separation.156 Thus, as indicated in the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision in the
context of parodies, the second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, was
considered of limited use. 157 For the third factor, amount and substantiality of use,
the court assessed whether Koons copied excessively beyond what was
“reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.” 158 The court found that only
using the woman’s legs from a larger photograph was an appropriate and
necessary amount in light of his social commentary purpose. 159 Finally, although
the fourth factor had previously been called the most important factor, 160 this
decision gave it short shrift.161 Instead of assessing the potential licensing market,
the court evaluated whether the original artist had taken advantage of the
licensing market in the past and whether Koons’ use caused any direct harm to
her.162 In so doing, the court shifted the burden from the party claiming fair use to
the copyright owner to prove what potential markets she had previously
exploited.163 This was an unusual shift from the norm where the party claiming
fair use should be the party with the burden of proof. 164 Moreover, it strongly
favored protecting currently successful exploiters of their works rather than
protecting all artists’ rights in future exploitations. Thus, began the fall down the
slippery slope to expand the scope of fair use in light of transformativeness.
C.

THE ASCENT OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS: CARIOU V. PRINCE

Seven years later, the Second Circuit decided Cariou v. Prince.165 Patrick
Cariou, a professional photographer, spent years living among Rastafarians in
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Compare Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253–59 (finding that “the broad principles of
Campbell are not limited to cases involving parody”), with Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
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Jamaica and created a book of portraits and landscapes. 166 Cariou had previously
published a compilation of surfer photographs and was contacted by a gallery
owner to see if he would be interested in creating an exhibit based on those surfer
photographs. 167 The discussion subsequently included his Romani photographs
and the Rastafarian portraits; the ultimate decision to not have an exhibit,
however, was heavily influenced by the appropriation art that led to the lawsuit. 168
Richard Prince, another highly successful appropriation artist, first
received recognition for appropriation art with his series of Cowboy works, which
entailed re-photographing images from of the Marlboro Man advertisements and
simply eliminating the tobacco product and advertising information. 169 Some in
the art world suggested that his work was a critique of the advertising world’s
exploitation or repurposing of our American mythology and a critique of
photography as capturing “truth”—even while recognizing purchasers may not
understand the pieces in the same way. 170 Others were less enamored. 171
For a new project, Prince purchased several copies of Cariou’s book of
Rastafarian portraits, tore many out, and altered them in a variety of ways. 172 For
example, he often enlarged photographs, sometimes mixed Cariou’s photographs
with other artists’ appropriated work, often painted “lozenges” over part of the
portrait’s facial features, and sometimes mixed in “dissonant” images like an
electric guitar.173 In his collage Canal Zone, Prince used 35 of Cariou’s photographs
or portions thereof.174 Prince produced 28 or 29 paintings, also reproduced in a
166

See id. at 698.

167

See id. at 703.

168

See id. at 703–04 (noting that the gallery owner believed that Cariou was
doing something with Richard Prince).
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See id. at 699, Collection: Richard Prince – Untitled (Cowboys), THE MUSEUM OF
CONTEMP. ART, L.A. (Mar. 16, 2014),
https://www.moca.org/collection/work/untitled-cowboys
[https://perma.cc/Y9MU-U8EW].
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for Photography, ARTCRITICAL.COM (Dec. 2005),
http://www.artcritical.com/appel/BAPrinceRecord.htm
[https://perma.cc/7UCR-BELX].
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catalogue, with images from Cariou’s works, and some of Prince’s works were
entirely composed of Cariou’s images with some alterations. 175 Despite what
Prince claimed to be transformative changes to Cariou’s work, the gallery owner
that had previously contacted Cariou seemed to think otherwise. 176 She indicated
that the Rastafarian portraits had been “done already” to the point where she was
not interested in putting together an exhibit with those images, thought that
perhaps Cariou was working with Prince, and did not “want to seem to be
capitalizing on Prince’s success and notoriety.”177
Cariou sued and mostly lost in the Second Circuit. 178 The court held, on
summary judgment, that at least twenty five of the appropriation art works
constituted fair use.179 At least five key points emerged, expanding the scope of
fair use. All resulted in heavily unbalancing fair use—both in the individual factor
analysis and in the overall weight apportioned to each factor.
First, with respect to transformativeness’s scope, the Cariou court
explicitly rejected any requirement that the appropriation art substantively related
to the original work. 180 Blanch involved an appropriation artist who was
commenting upon or critiquing the original work. 181 While the court noted that
parody was not required if satire existed, that was done in a context where one
could argue that Koons was doing both. 182 He was using one representation of
mass media in order to criticize mass media. 183 Thus, it was a broader critique that
equally applied to the original work. In contrast, the Cariou court entirely rejected
any need to argue that the secondary work commented, critiqued, or otherwise
was connected to the meaning of the original work even in cases when the
secondary work constituted a potentially competing, and commercially successful,
product.184
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Second, under the guise of using the reasonable observer standard, the
Cariou court seemed to use its own aesthetic to determine that twenty-five of
Prince’s pieces were transformative. 185 Unlike prior decisions, the court did not
refer to the artists’ stated intentions or any gathered expert opinions nor did it shy
away from making an aesthetic judgment. 186 Perhaps this was a function of
Prince’s inconsistent statements. In one portion of Prince’s deposition testimony,
he stated that, regardless of the original artist’s intent, his intent was to make
something completely different and also a contemporary take on the music
scene.187 At the same time, Prince testified that he “doesn’t really have a message”
to convey with his art.188 To the contrary, the district court decision noted that
Prince’s stated intent was to “pay homage or tribute to other painters, including
Picasso, Cezanne, Warhol, and de Kooning and to create beautiful artworks which
relate to musical themes and to a post-apocalyptic screenplay he was writing
which featured a reggae band.” 189 Accordingly, Prince did not really argue or
explain how or why his pieces would be transformative (other than his right to use
others’ works as raw materials) 190 despite the fact that this was an affirmative
defense.191 As William Patry noted, “[under this kind of] argument, one artist is
free to plunder the works of others, devoid of any justification other than one’s
claimed status as an artist.”192
Regardless, the court made the transformative determination for Prince,
ostensibly by utilizing a reasonable observer standard. 193 Thus, the court shifted
the focus in determining transformativeness from the artist’s stated intent to
(presumably) the audience’s reaction. 194 But, in truth, this failed to shift to the
audience’s reaction for two reasons. First, the court assessed the works side-by-

185

See id. at 710–11 (For five of Prince’s works, the court remanded for further
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transformative on summary judgment.).
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side even though it is not clear an audience would do so or have that experience. 195
Second, the court took its perspective to be that of the reasonable observer.196 Not
only did this cross into judging art, but it also assumed that the court would be
able to capture the reaction of the reasonable observer without defining who the
reasonable observer is—the general public, art aficionados or experts, or even
simply those who could afford to purchase Prince’s high priced art. Even
assuming that the reasonable observer is a reasonable person from the general
public (as the scope of copyright protection purportedly benefits the general
public), the court failed to identify what efforts one should take to capture a true
sense of the general public.197 Furthering the domination of transformativeness,
the Cariou court discounted the importance of commercialization in light of the
works’ transformative nature. 198 The court discussed no other first factor
considerations.199
Third, consistent with the Blanch decision, the Second Circuit greatly
discounted the second and third fair use factors. The second factor lacked import
because the secondary work was transformative.200 And as to the third factor, the
Second Circuit continued to apply the Campbell court’s parody discussions to
transformative, non-parodic secondary works. 201 Thus, the Second Circuit stated
that “[t]he secondary use ‘must be [permitted] to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of the
original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.”202 The Supreme Court’s statement
was placed specifically within the context of a parody, which must reference the
original in order to mock it.203 The Second Circuit provided no explanation why a
transformative work must be able to conjure up the original when it already stated
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(2016).
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that a transformative work does not have to comment upon the original.
Regardless, for at least twenty-five works, the court weighed this factor heavily in
Prince’s favor because of their transformative natures. 204 In so doing, the second
and third factors were essentially mooted once a secondary work was deemed
transformative.
Fourth, the Cariou court took the Campbell language regarding the fourth
factor, market effects, entirely out of context in order to deny Cariou any benefit
from this factor. Campbell involved a parody that also transformed a song into a
rap. 205 In the context of evaluating the parody component, the Supreme Court
noted that a successful parody, or other critical work, may actually destroy the
market for the original work because it made the original work seem old
fashioned, outdated, and the like.206 In other words, a parody may have harmed
the market for the original, but only in a way that served the purpose of criticism
inherent in parody. 207 The Cariou court made clear that transformative works need
not even criticize or comment upon the original, 208 which should mean that the
Supreme Court’s limitations as to critical works should be inapplicable unless there
is a finding that the transformative work was also critical of the original work in
some way. This is not what the Cariou court did.209 Instead, the Cariou court stated
that the more transformative the use, the less likely it served as a substitute for the
original.210
Further, the Campbell decision included evaluating potential markets that
the creator of the original works would develop or license, which could extend
beyond the markets already exploited. 211 The Supreme Court directed
consideration of the type of markets that the original work’s type of artist may
explore for the type of work; it did so in the context of noting that parodies/critical
works are generally not markets exploited by artists. 212 The Cariou court distorted
this fourth factor by limiting potential markets to situations where “the infringer’s
204
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205
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target audience and the nature of the infringing content is the same as the
original.”213 Thus, even though both were art pieces and potentially displayed in
galleries, the Cariou court segmented the market further by examining if the pieces
appealed to the same segment of the art purchasing market, limiting its analysis
of the original work to markets already exploited.214 Ultimately, the Cariou court
found that Prince’s audience was different from Cariou’s, no evidence indicated
that Prince’s work was the kind that Cariou would license, and there was no
evidence that Prince’s work impacted Cariou’s marketing of the photographs;
therefore, this factor weighed in Prince’s favor. 215 This was particularly
problematic when the court’s decision, in this case that Prince’s work was mostly
fair use, could eliminate a portion of the usual photography licensing market. 216
Moreover, it demonstrated that a finding of transformativeness, the only factor
that focuses on the interests of the secondary work’s author, was so powerful as to
significantly diminish the chances of the original work’s artist defeating a fair use
defense.
Fifth, an additional troubling aspect of the court’s fourth factor analysis
was the tremendous burden it placed on the copyright owner to defeat a fair use
claim by a “transformative” work’s author. The court sought evidence from
Cariou regarding whether he ever would/could develop or license secondary uses
of his work in art like Prince’s work. 217 By asking Cariou to establish his business
model and any harms, rather than the defendant, the court burdened the plaintiff
and seemed to diminish Cariou’s copyright rights simply because he had not
aggressively marketed his work and had earned little money thus far from his
Rastafarian photograph book. 218 For example, Prince sold eight pieces for $10.4
million at an event opening his Canal Zone exhibit, whereas Cariou had earned

213
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just over $8,000 in royalties from his book.219 The court seemed to punish Cariou
for being a less successful artist and businessperson than Prince.
And finally, also interesting was a deposition excerpt noted only by the
district court. Prince testified that he appropriated other artist’s work because
“doing so helps him ‘get as much fact into [his] work and reduce[d] the amount of
speculation.’” 220 Prince used Cariou’s work because they were an accurate
representation of Rastafarians.221 Being so comfortable with taking other artist’s
photographs suggested an implicit assumption that photographs, particularly
portraits, reflect reality and, therefore, appropriately constituted raw materials just
as any other component of reality would.222 However, it also suggested that Prince
really had no need to take Cariou’s work because Cariou’s creative contribution
was not required. Instead, any accurate photographs of Rastafarians would have
been sufficient, including ones taken by Prince himself or in the public domain.
Perhaps Prince was simply avoiding “the drudgery” 223 of getting his own raw
materials.
As argued below, this run contrary to the spirit of fair use, specifically that
it is most appropriate when the original work adds some unique value to the
secondary work. 224 Moreover, it is highly ironic that Prince’s appropriation of
Carious’ photographs was justified as constituting accurate representations,
capturing the truth of reality, when the art world justified his rephotography as
denying “one of the main tenets of the medium of photography—its inherent
ability to record ‘truth.’”225
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(APPROPRIATION) ART FAIR USE CLAIMS AFTER CARIOU

Richard Prince continues to challenge the boundaries of art and fair use.
Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that two of the more recent appropriation
art cases, still pending final resolution, are suits against him. 226 The most
informative to date is Graham v. Prince, based upon Donald Graham’s well
recognized work, a black and white photograph called Rastafarian Smoking a Joint,
which aptly describes the content. 227 Prince found an Instagram posting
reproducing the work, added a comment, and then took a screenshot of the
Instagram photograph with his comment along with other Instagram markers. 228
The photograph itself was nearly untouched, merely cropped a little bit. 229 The
screenshot was reproduced onto a canvas and included in the Gagosian Gallery’s
New Portraits exhibition and catalog, along with 36 other Instagram screenshot
works.230 Prince also posted his work on a Manhattan billboard for several months
and on Twitter.231
To date, the Graham court has only decided a motion to dismiss on the fair
use argument.232 Because the fair use inquiry is so fact dependent, the court noted
its general caution in granting dismissal based on fair use; and so, it is not
surprising that this court did not grant Prince’s motion to dismiss.233 Importantly,
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the court made its decision even while noting that transformativeness is the “heart
of the fair use inquiry.” 234
Also importantly, the Graham court heavily reiterated each of the Second
Circuit’s confused and problematic Cariou standards, including the use of a sideby-side comparison and the “reasonable observer” standard to determine
transformativeness.235 Specifically, the Graham court suggested that the reader of
the opinion may be a “reasonable observer” while still not clarifying who or what
that is.236 The aesthetic determinations again relied upon the court’s assessment of
the works without reference to anyone else’s expertise, experience, or
knowledge. 237 However, because Prince used Graham’s entire photograph, the
court suggested that Prince would need substantial evidentiary support for
transformativeness, such as from art criticism or even evidence of the artist’s
intent, noting that the latter may be helpful but is not dispositive.238 In so doing,
the court implied either that the reasonable observer standard is only applicable
to works that are significantly altered or that the determination can and should be
influenced by evidence of the artist’s intent. 239
Despite reiterating the Second Circuit’s Cariou decision, there is one place
where the Graham court deviated from the Cariou decision in ways that inch
towards rebalancing the fair use inquiry. 240 The court assessed the second fair use
factor and found that it weighed in favor of Graham. 241 Regardless, the court
deemed discovery necessary to evaluate the first and fourth fair use factors.” 242
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The second pending Prince suit has no reported decisions yet. Once again,
it is a copyright infringement suit brought by a photographer against Prince for
use of a black and white portrait, this time of musician Kim Gordon, in a different
New Portraits show.243 Prince allegedly uploaded the photograph, with a caption,
to Instagram himself and then reproduced it as he did in Graham.244 Although the
cases are not joined, it appears that this court will follow any determination made
by the court in Graham.245 Further, within days of each other, Prince made the same
summary judgment argument in both cases, using art experts.246 Given that Prince
reproduced the entire original works, skeptics argue that even if it is art, it should
not be fair use.247
The final, and most recent, “appropriation art” case involves a titan, Andy
Warhol. The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts filed a declaratory
judgment against Lynn Goldsmith regarding a photograph of the musician
Prince. 248 Vanity Fair licensed Goldsmith’s photograph to use as an artist’s
reference and commissioned Warhol to create an illustration of Prince. 249 Although
243
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it is disputed as to whether Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph, Warhol
subsequently created 16 works depicting Prince’s face and a bit of his neck. 250
Relying heavily on the Cariou decision, the court found Warhol’s works to
be “plainly” fair use.251 As with Cariou, the court made several key findings with
respect to transformativeness: the secondary work had a different aesthetic based
on Goldsmith’s articulated intent, the court identified differences in composition
and aesthetic, and the court noted that the secondary work was “immediately
recognizable as a ‘Warhol’ rather than a photograph of Prince . . . .”252 Like Graham,
the court actually assessed the second factor, but influenced by Cariou, the court
deemed the second factor neutral as the court found Warhol’s work to be
transformative and as the original work was published.253 Transformativeness also
heavily influenced the court’s third factor analysis, amount and substantiality of
use. The court undertook a fuller analysis, but ultimately its findings depended on
the fact that Warhol eliminated several of Goldsmith’s original elements,
transforming the look. 254 Likewise, the court found the fourth factor favored
Warhol because of the works’ transformative nature. 255
Aside from involving appropriation art, many appropriation cases have
one important thing in common: favoring famous artists over lesser known artists.
A famous artist, now Andy Warhol, appropriates the work of a lesser known artist,
in this case Lynn Goldsmith, and his recognizable branding becomes important in
finding transformativeness. 256 One must query whether appropriation art fair use
simply favors the famous over the majority of artists. 257 And it certainly distorts
the economic incentive structure inherent in the copyright regime, particularly
because transformativeness addresses the secondary user’s interests, but the other
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three factors address the interests of the original work’s artist.258 Adding insult to
injury, the lesser known artist may be subject to tremendous expenses defending
a declaratory judgment action brought by the appropriating artist.259
Although these specific cases involve what has been termed appropriation
art, the term is less important than the behavior. Many pieces of recent visual art
involve some form of appropriation.260 Further, one may wonder if other circuits,
like the Ninth Circuit, have more carefully considered fair use in visual art.261 Two
2013 Central District of California decisions may hearten photographers because
fair use arguments were rejected regarding altered photographs of various Sex
Pistol band members. 262
However, only a few months later and after the Second Circuit’s Cariou
decision, the Ninth Circuit leaned closer to the Second Circuit jurisprudence on
appropriation art, this time, for an artist who has no reputation as an appropriation
artist. 263 In Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., Seltzer created the Scream Icon, a closely
cropped, screaming, contorted face, which was then reproduced and plastered on
walls as street art.264 A filmmaker photographed a weathered copy from a Los
Angeles brick wall, cropped and enlarged it, changed the coloring, added black
258

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1116.

259

See Stephen Carlisle, Warhol v. Goldsmith: A Terrible Decision, Correctly
Decided, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN U. (July 11, 2019),
http://copyright.nova.edu/warhol-v-goldsmith [https://perma.cc/AUC7EM29] (noting that Goldstein started a GoFundMe page to help with her
legal fees, $400,000 through this motion).

260

See, e.g., Adler, supra note 195, at 571.

261

The Ninth Circuit has long been considered a significant circuit for
copyright decisions. See, e.g., Michael C. Albin, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Satire
in its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L. REV. 518, 538 (1985); Allison M. Scott, Oh
Bother: Milne, Steinbeck, and an Emerging Circuit Split over the Alienability of
Copyright Termination Rights, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 359–60 (2007).

262

See Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684 JAK, 2013 WL 440127, at *1, *3
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (finding that, with no justification provided, an
appropriation artist’s modifications of Morris’ photograph is irrelevant and
applied all fair use factors to find no fair use); Morris v. Young, 925 F. Supp.
2d 1078, 1084–89 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Although not called an appropriation
artist, Young’s fair use argument was rejected in summary judgment for two
of three works when he took images from the internet and created works by,
for example, slightly cropping and tinting a photograph red.).

263

Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2013).
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streaks, and painted a large red cross across it. 265 For Green Day’s tour, the
filmmaker centrally placed the altered Scream Icon in a larger and changing set of
images to serve as the backdrop for a specific, religiously-oriented song; although
other parts of the stage would change with new art and alterations to three images
of Jesus Christ, the altered Scream Icon never moved or changed.266 In finding that
this was fair use, much of the Ninth Circuit analysis paralleled the Second Circuit’s
Cariou decision with just a few changes.
First, when assessing transformativeness, the court seemed to place
weight on the fact that the Scream Icon was used as raw materials, only a
component of a larger work. 267 Second, the court was not clear whose
interpretation of the original Scream Icon mattered; it offered its own reaction as
well as the artist’s intent; regardless, it found that the original was clearly not
religious while the backdrop and song were.268 Third, the Ninth Circuit did give
weight to the second and third factors.269 However, when considering the quantity
taken, the court found that the original work was not meaningfully divisible,
ultimately neutralizing this factor.270 The court did not specify why this was so,
when visual art would be meaningfully divisible, or by what standard this should
be determined. 271
Seltzer provided few facts about market harm, which may have
significantly affected the ultimate conclusion. 272 Regardless, this case indicates
both that there may be some analytical creep from the Second Circuit to other
circuits and that works need not be labeled appropriation art to trigger a similar
fair use analysis.
IV.

REBALANCING THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF FAIR USE

Despite Judge Leval’s admirable attempt to provide grounding to the fair
use inquiry, courts have distorted the balance in appropriation art cases. The arc
of these cases demonstrate that problems still exist and perhaps are exacerbated in
visual art disputes. Many courts seem to use transformativeness as a conclusory
265

Id. at 1174.

266

Id.

267

See id. at 1176–77.

268

See id. at 1177.

269

Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2013).
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See id.
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See id.

272

See id. at 1179.
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label denoting that the court feels the use is “fair,” rather than as a deeply
evaluated consideration in the first fair use factor. 273 Further, despite claiming that
there is a reasonable observer standard, that determination is most often based
upon the judge’s perception of transformation, analogous to Justice Stewart’s
pornography standard: the court knows it when it sees it.274
Over time and in the context of appropriation art, courts have made it
easier to deem a work transformative, which conversely makes it more difficult
for copyright artists to assert their rights. 275 If there is any validity to the economic
incentive story as the justification for U.S. copyright laws, then allowing a lax fair
use standard will discourage some artists or decrease artists’ output because they
will not be able to capture the expected, full economic benefits. 276 Certainly one
could question the incentive story, but some artists themselves have expressed the
importance of their copyright rights and want to reinvigorate that economic
incentive.277 The concern is that others will be able to use the artists’ original work
simply because they want to, because it is easier, or because it is cheaper. On the
other hand, if fair use becomes too high a hurdle, it creates boundaries that chill
some creativity that could benefit the general public, the ultimate purpose of the
copyright law.278 Striking the right balance is not easy but is necessary to avoid
vitiating the copyright incentive structure in the U.S.279 Three steps can help: (1)
273

See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 13.05[A][1][b].

274

See Carlisle, supra note 259.

275

See supra Part III.

276

See Schaumann, supra note 3, at 263–64 (recognizing that part of the analysis
must depend on whether “any particular unauthorized use is dangerous
because it impairs the economic incentive to create[,]” despite arguing for
significant copying ability to allow for appropriation art). Further, if nothing
else, the output may be decreased because, failing to capture economic
benefits from their art, artists will be forced to spend more time in other paid
employment rather than in creating more art.

277

See Cohen, supra note 23.

278

See Lunney, supra note 3, at 814; Schaumann, supra note 3, at 260–61.

279

Some commentators raise concerns about a copyright regime that attempts
to shape behavior rather than merely reflect agreed upon social norms. See,
e.g., PATRY, supra note 6, at 165–71, 173–76. However, others suggest that
artists in particular are hungering for a clearer articulation of their rights and
opportunities. See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., COPYRIGHT, PERMISSIONS,
AND FAIR USE AMONG VISUAL ARTISTS AND THE ACADEMIC AND MUSEUM
VISUAL ARTS COMMUNITIES: AN ISSUES REPORT 5 (2014),
http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIssuesReport.pdf
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reinvigorate the multifactor test; (2) use an objective standard to assess artist’s
intent for transformativeness; and (3) add a consideration of fungibility to the first
factor.
A.

MULTIFACTOR TESTS REQUIRE MULTIFACTOR ASSESSMENT

The fair use analysis is intended to weigh the copyright rights of the
original artist against the needs of other artists to utilize the original artist’s work,
in other words, the need to loosen copyright’s monopolistic nature to encourage
new creativity.280 The first fair use factor focuses on the interests and needs of the
accused infringer, but the other three factors direct focus on the original artist’s
interests.281
Consideration of both sides’ interests is critical.282 Accordingly, perhaps
the most obvious problem with some courts’ fair use assessments are the quick
dismissals of any factor other than transformativeness in the ultimate decision. 283
The fair use factors, which are not even an exclusive list, are intended to present
the different ways one could slice and dice the respective interests at play in
copyright and fair use. 284 The Cariou court, based upon the Supreme Court’s
Campbell decision involving a parody, has led courts astray with respect to
transformativeness in two ways. First, it drew too much of an analogy between

[https://perma.cc/ZKJ5-TMKN] (noting that many artists are actually
censoring their work, as opposed to the appropriation artists highlighted in
this Article, because they are unaware of how fair use may protect their
projects). Providing greater clarity as to the scope of fair use in advance can
provide better guidance for artists and may avoid costly litigation to resolve
disputes.
280

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1116.

281

See id.

282

See id. at 1111 (“[I]t is not sufficient simply to conclude whether or not
justification exists. The question remains how powerful, or persuasive, is the
justification, because the court must weigh the strength of the secondary
user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright owner.”).

283

The Seventh Circuit made a similar critique of the Second Circuit’s approach
in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).

284

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1110.
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parodic works and all types of transformative works.285 Second, it gave short shrift
to all of the other factors, and particularly the fourth factor.286
As to the first point, a good, valuable, or funny parody really must do two
things simultaneously: it must relate to or reflect the original work for purposes of
ridicule while also making it clear that it is not the original work. 287 Original works
subject to parody are likely to be more creative. 288 Therefore, in order to allow
breathing room for parodies, which is the kind of criticism for which an original
work’s artist is unlikely to grant a license, the second fair use factor on the nature
of the copyrighted work becomes nearly a nullity.289
Likewise, the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, is less valuable in assessing
fair use for a parody. 290 A sufficient amount of the work (quantitatively and/or
qualitatively) must be taken to make the parody effective both as a criticism and
to make the subject of criticism recognizable for the audience. 291 Again, following
the Campbell decision regarding the unique nature of parody as a pointed criticism
imbued with humor, the third factor now becomes an assessment of whether the
amount taken “conjures up” the original or is more than necessary in light of its
parodic justification.292 Interestingly, the Cariou court rejected the notion that the
taking must be no greater than necessary, thus further diminishing the importance
of the third factor for a work that is transformative, even if not parodic. 293
285

See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2013).

286

See id. at 708–10.

287

See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745, 747
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

288

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).

289

See, e.g., Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 979 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Henley v. Devore, No.
SACV 09-481 JVS (RNBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *38 (C.D. Cal. June
10, 2010); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F.
Supp. 2d 495, 507 (E.D. Va. 2006).

290

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.

291

See id. at 569–88 (finding that 2 Live Crew did not take too much by using
the same opening riff and first line when added other sounds and departed
markedly from the original work’s lyrics; the court did remand as to the
music).

292

See, e.g., Henley, 2010 US Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *39–40; Louis Vuitton, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 507.

293

See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013).
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The Supreme Court’s decision to give such short shrift to the second and
third factors for parodies is inextricably intertwined with the unique nature of a
parody. 294 The short shrift given to these factors in Campbell is neither an
indictment of the usefulness of the factors nor is it truly ignoring the factors. It is
merely an assessment that, in light of what a parody does, these factors will always
be of little help in weighing whether these critical, humorous works should be fair
use.295 One can assume that many artists are, after all, unlikely to open themselves
up to a parody via license. The real inquiry is whether what was taken was
necessary to be effective and the effectiveness of the parody. 296
However, the wholesale adoption of this standard for all transformative
works is wholly inappropriate. Transformativeness should be assessed in its
broadest sense to determine whether there is “new expression, meaning, or
message.” 297 If that is true, then the specific type of transformativeness alleged
should dictate how the second and third factors are assessed and greater weight
may be appropriate where the relationship between the original and secondary
work does not involve comment, criticism, or the like. And yet, the Second Circuit
essentially applied the same weight to these factors as one would in a parody. 298
To do so vitiates these factors for nearly any derivative work.299
The consequence of improperly, presumptively diminishing these factors
is hard to quantify because no factor should be dispositive. Generally, however,
the secondary user raising fair use should have a harder time to prove fair use if
the work is creative and if the user took a significant portion of the work.300
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See supra notes 287–93 and accompanying text.
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See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586, 587 (1994).
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See supra notes 287–93 and accompanying text.
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Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.
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See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013).
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The Second Circuit suggested that there are derivative works that would not
be transformative, such as “a book of synopses of televisions [sic] shows.” Id.
at 708. Given a broad enough definition, however, one could argue that the
selection of facts and arrangement of information is transformative.
Additionally, it is notable that the Supreme Court held that a use does not
need to be transformative to be fair. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

300

See, e.g., Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563–65
(1985) (holding that fair use is less likely to be found where a large quantity
and/or quality of an original work is used).
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Thus, for example, Koons’ criticism of mass media using Blanch’s
photograph301 would be taking creative work out of necessity to comment on its
meaning, and the amount taken actually was limited to be sufficient for his
commentary. These factors may weigh in favor of fair use for Koons. And if Koons’
work was a parody, then taking more may have been appropriate. But Prince
indicated that he was not looking to comment on the creative choices or contexts
of Cariou’s work, but rather simply sought the factual depiction of Rastafarian
portraits. 302 Thus, whether he took a creative work seems a valuable inquiry.
Likewise, the amount taken seems relevant. Reinstating these requirements in
accordance with the kind of transformative work may do much to rebalance the
manner in which fair use has been distorted.
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the fourth factor,
effect of the use upon the potential market or value for the copyright work, is the
most important element.303 Even when the Supreme Court recognized the limited
value of the second and third factors for a parodic work, it still reaffirmed the
importance of the fourth factor.304 Of all the factors, this one most directly assesses
the economic impact of fair use on the original work’s artist. 305
Ironically, Judge Leval seemed to be concerned that courts would treat the
fourth factor as nearly dispositive even with negligible economic loss to the
original work’s artist. 306 Unfortunately, courts have taken his recommendation
simply to change where their dispositive determination lies; now, courts focus on
transformativeness.307
Moreover, in line with the parody cases, the Cariou court expressed
significant skepticism with respect to derivative markets to the point where any
market other than those already exploited by Cariou seemed discounted or
irrelevant.308 Doing so dramatically undermines the economic incentive structure,
particularly for industries where derivative/licensing markets can be significant,
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See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2006).
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See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.

303

See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
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See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586–94.
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See Leval, supra note 1, at 1124.
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See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013).
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like photography.309 Further, to consider only existing market exploitation by the
original owner unfairly benefits artists that are already successful, undermining
creativity incentivization for those who have yet to be recognized by the
marketplace or are simply not as good businesspeople. 310 Failing to take into
account potential markets based on the industry could undermine existing
markets for the original work as well as chill similar types of works by other
artists.311
Fair use is intended to weigh the interests of all the stakeholders in
creativity.312 Recognizing that fair use should be used to respond to the already
established infringement of the copyright owner’s rights, Judge Leval noted that
the “transformative justification must overcome factors favoring the copyright
owner,”313 which means taking a serious, independent evaluation of all the fair use
factors. The second user can always find a way to assert that his or her use is
transformative, but such use may not be justified if the secondary user’s taking is
excessive or not in line with the purpose alleged by the secondary user. 314
Furthermore, the fourth factor must be given full consideration to avoid stripping
the original work’s owner of his or her derivative works right in toto. That full
consideration will not happen if the fourth factor is denuded such that it only
weighs against fair use if the two works are pure market substitutes for the
markets in which the original work has already been exploited.
Transformativeness does not take this consideration into account, 315 and so the
fourth factor must be properly assessed in future cases.
Finally, if courts return to a fair assessment of all factors, they must also
return to a balanced assessment. Most of these factors are (or should be) assessed
on a spectrum. Therefore, courts should resist simply counting the factors and

309

See, e.g., About Overview, DIG. MEDIA LICENSING ASS’N,
http://www.digitalmedialicensing.org/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/PW7QMH9K] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (introducing the Digital Media Licensing
Association, which started in 1951 and is currently involved in digital
licensing for more than 100 companies in addition to promoting and
protecting the interests of the medial licensing community).
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ruling for the party with the greatest number.316 Instead, to fully rebalance fair use,
courts must weigh the strength of each factor carefully in making their final fair
use determinations.
B.

WHOSE MEANING MATTERS FOR TRANSFORMATIVENESS –
TRANSFORMING TO GUIDANCE

Even if the fair use factors are rebalanced, the transformative assessment
is still a problem. The foundational, exemplar transformativeness cases involve
written or spoken words. 317 This is not to say that the interpretation of words in
verbal or written form is perfectly clear; witness the numerous contract
interpretation disputes, including over methodology. 318 Words at least give a
starting place utilizing various common understandings to try and divine
meaning. 319 With less guidance, courts currently must compare the meaning or
message of visual art pieces (perhaps including perceptions of aesthetics) to assess
transformativeness. 320 Purportedly using the reasonable observer standard, the
recent appropriation art cases demonstrate the difficulty in defining the meaning
attributable to visual art and seem rife with inconsistencies and unpredictability.321
The difficulties in defining transformativeness seem tied to resolving a
fundamental question, namely, whose perception or meaning matters. On a
simplistic level, there are two general choices: the audience or the artist. 322

316

See Leval, supra note 1, at 1110–11.

317

See supra Part II.
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See, e.g., Joshua M. Silverstein, Contract Interpretation Enforcement Costs: An
Empirical Study of Textualism Versus Contextualism Conducted Via the West Key
Number System, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1011 (2019); Tushnet, supra note 24, at
702.
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See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687,
1695–96 (2014) (considering the rise of visual images in legal advocacy and
potential problems, including the lack of tools for interpreting visual
persuasion as compared to the traditions and debates in interpreting
ambiguous text).
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See supra Parts III.C–D.
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See supra notes 185–207, 236–39 and accompanying text.
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Professor Alfred Yen suggests that aestheticians have three approaches used
in interpreting art: (1) formalism (there is one objective meaning); (2)
intentionalism (the artist’s intent governs); and (3) reader-oriented theories
(meaning exists in the mind of the audience). See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright
Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 261–66 (1998). Focusing
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Presuming that the audience means the general public, one may argue that this
approach best supports the goal of copyright law, to encourage more creative
works for the public’s benefit. 323 If the general public perceives a new message
(really that the secondary work adds to the repository of art), then the public
receives the intended benefit. 324 Relying on the general public’s perception,
however, is flawed. Although not in the copyright context, the Claudio v. United
States decision aptly demonstrates the problem with using a general audience
standard.325 Claudio created a painting and applied for a license to display it in a
federal building’s main entrance. 326 Inexplicably, he was granted the license
without providing information regarding the content of the painting or even a
title.327 Claudio chose to display a painting entitled Sex, Laws & Coathangers:328
The work bears a painting of a nude female and, attached to the
canvas, a three-dimensional representation of a human fetus and
a metal wire coathanger. The curved end of the coathanger is
partially straightened, and the coathanger appears to be dripping
blood. The work measures approximately ten feet long by seven
feet high.329
Some additional elements: the woman is wearing a gold crucifix around
her neck, part of an American flag covers part of her face, one end of the
coathanger points to the word “laws,” and the fetus and area around it is tinged

on the latter two, this Article suggests that the recognized flaws in each
theory and the specific purpose of fair use demonstrate that a fixed
interpretation is not required or appropriate to guide artists to create more
art for the benefit of the general public.
323

See generally Tushnet, supra note 24, at 751 (noting the important interests of
the audience).
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See Claudio v. United States (Claudio I), 836 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D.N.C. 1993),
aff’d, 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994).
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or streaked with red. 330 Additionally, the canvas itself is in the form of a cross. 331
Although the work must concern abortion, both parties conceded that they could
not identify whether the painting’s viewpoint was pro-choice or pro-life.332 The
court itself deemed the painting ambiguous. 333
Consider the Claudio I court’s experience in the context of fair use
transformativeness. Under modern art theory and for contemporary visual art,
“meanings can be contradictory, multiple[,] and are certainly open-ended and
unstable.” 334 In teaching contemporary visual art interpretation, a Tate Paper
suggests that the process of interpretation be rigorous even though the result may
lead to a multitude of meanings, potentially even contradictory ones. 335 This
reflects the postmodern notion that “the world is given meaning through local,
personal narratives rather than one grand, master narrative . . . .” 336 As a
consequence, “[g]reat art has many layers and a multiplicity of possible
meanings.”337
Particularly when it comes to contemporary art, therefore, it is fallacy to
attempt to impose one meaning or one message upon the art.338 Perhaps one could
330

See id. at 1232–33 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff’d, 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994).

331

See Claudio v. United States (Claudio II), 836 F. Supp. 1230, 33 (E.D.N.C.
1993), aff’d, 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994).
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See id. at 1230.

333

See id. at 1236.
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Helen Charman & Michaela Ross, Contemporary Art and the Role of
Interpretation, TATE (2004),
https://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/02/contemporaryart-and-the-role-of-interpretation [https://perma.cc/3SMW-CY4B] (noting the
challenges posed by the process of interpretation in contemporary visual
art).
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See id.; see also Terry Barrett, Principles for Interpreting Art, 47 ART EDUC. 8, 9–
10 (1994) (“No single interpretation is exhaustive of the meaning of an
artwork and there can be different, competing, and contradictory
interpretations of the same work.”).
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Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 446–
47 (2008) (discussing Roland’s Barthes’ view that text is interpreted
contextually by the readers, otherwise called the reader-response theory).
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ARTS RES. 42, 46 (1989).
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survey the relevant audience to narrow down the options, but in the trademark
context, the untrustworthiness of survey data is often raised.339 One can assume
that similar concerns about study design to test the meaning of visual art,
especially in light of the post-modern take on art interpretation, may make it
difficult to determine the meaning by any audience greater than one. Therefore,
using the general public to ascertain one particular meaning for the original and
secondary works respectively seems a futile exercise, certainly one that is rife with
lack of clarity, unpredictability, and even contradictions. 340 Further, the artist is
more likely to be steeped in artistic history and more likely to be able to consider
and be able to articulate the specifics to which the work is responding. 341
There are two alternate, potential measures of audience perception: the
court or experts. As demonstrated by the modern appropriation decisions, relying
upon the court’s perception is entirely unpredictable and appears subjective.342 It
also runs counter to Justice Holmes cogent articulation as to why attorneys and
judges should never be in the position to assess what art is worthy. 343 As to art
experts, this could open the door for a battle of the experts over questions
analogous to what is art. While courts are well versed in handling such battles,
reliance on experts also falls into the trap of looking for an “authoritative voice”

339

See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d
558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Trouble v. Wet Seal, 179 F. Supp. 2d 291, 307–08
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).

340

Cf. Heymann, supra note 336, at 448–49 (advocating to use the reader’s
interpretation in the context of text). However, Professor Laura Heymann
also notes that, when the artist is famous, the artist’s stated intent may
impact the reader’s reaction as compared to a lesser artist. See id. at 449–50.
Although she recognizes the danger, such bias fundamentally undermines
the use of a reader-centered approach to determining transformativeness
because readers will be influenced by who the artist is rather than what the
artist produced; the focus will not be on advancing more creative works, but
supporting already famous artists, exacerbating an already existing problem.
See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 257, at 375.

341

See generally Adler, supra note 195, at 610, 612–13 (discussing contemporary
art as an insider’s game and arguing for an art world insider as the
appropriate viewer).
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to deem one meaning as the superior or only meaning and may simply support
art world superstars to the detriment of the lesser known. 344
More importantly, if one must wait until there is an audience for the
secondary work to determine if the original work’s meaning is transformed, then
the fair use doctrine is less capable or completely incapable of guiding artists when
creating new art. 345 The uncertainty is likely to chill expression for artists less selfassured and with less wealth than the Koonses and Princes of the art world. In
fact, the ambiguity now present is already chilling the production of art. 346
One may argue that seeking the artist’s intent is equally problematic. As
with art experts, one may characterize it as simply seeking one authoritative voice
as to the artwork’s meaning. 347 In fact, because the artist will have only one
interpretation (if that), it falls into the same problem of asserting one meaning over
all others, in contradiction to the post-modern approach. 348
Moreover, perhaps what transformativeness should be assessing is not the
imposition of an actual meaning on the works. Rather, fair use writ large should
help guide artists in determining whether they can make additional works with
344

See Charman & Ross, supra note 334; Adler, supra note 195, at 616; see also
Anderson, supra note 337, at 45–46 (1989) (“The discursive meanings of
paintings, sculptures, even photographs may not be self-evident, however,
precisely because of all the possibilities for meaning intrinsic to the
intellectualization of art . . . . In a pluralistic culture that spawns a pluralistic
art subculture, one cannot hope to have integrated all the necessary
premises for complete understanding of all images.”).

345

Professor Heymann notes that, when a text is released, discursive
communities are created around those texts that engage with and begin to
offer interpretive views. See Heymann, supra note 336, at 455. Over time, the
reaction of these discursive communities may change. See id. at 455–56. This
weighs against using the reader response as the response may be entirely
different depending on when the copyright suit is brought, which again will
fail to guide artists planning new works. See also Subotnik, supra note 46, at
974 (noting some work may not have a community prior to litigation).

346

See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 279 (noting that many artists are
censoring their work, as opposed to the appropriation artists highlighted in
this Article, because they are unaware of how fair use may protect their
projects).

347

See Charman & Ross, supra note 334.

348

See Barrett, supra note 335, at 11; see also Subotnik, supra note 46, at 940, 971
(noting that “putting weight on user intent risks barring uses by those
unable to express–or to afford competent legal counsel to help them
express–legally compliant goals”).
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the materials on hand.349 Transformativeness, specifically, can be used to assess
whether the artist’s intention in utilizing the original work, realized or not, was
simply lazy appropriation or was intended to create new art for the public’s
benefit—in other words, whether allowing the appropriation art without
requiring the customary remuneration to the original work’s artist serves the
public benefit.350 This approach comports with the copyright regime’s approach
writ large: the focus is on affecting the artist in order to garner the greatest benefit
to the public.351 As long as such reaction is not treated as an interpretation but solely
as evidence of intention, then it seems to avoid the problems of multi-verse
interpretations expected for modern works while providing guideposts for artists
generating more works.
Even so, this Article does not suggest that the court should peer into the
artist’s mind to ascertain a subjective artistic intent. Among other problems,
relying upon an artist’s stated intent raises the concern of a post-hoc
rationalization to accommodate a stronger fair use argument and/or requires an
artist to articulate his or her intent, which may be difficult.352 This concern about
post-dispute changes is one reason that contract formation is no longer dependent
upon the parties’ subjective intent. 353
There is another option, however. Fair use must function as a channeling
doctrine–to channel artistic behavior in ways that strike the right balance between
incentivization
and
avoiding
chilling
creativity. 354
Accordingly,
transformativeness should be circumscribed in a way that provides guidance to
artists contemplating or creating future works. 355 As with contract formation, an

349

See Adler, supra note 195, at 582 (citing a curator, Professor Adler argues that
Jeff Koons altered his artistic style in direct response to losing his Banality
Show fair use cases. Also noting that fair use has affected other artists).

350

While the goal is to provide guidance to artists, this Article advocates for
using intent as an intention to communicate new expression rather than an
intent to comply with the statutory fair use factors or to be a good citizen.
See Subotnik, supra note 46, at 947–49.

351

See supra note 3.

352

See, e.g., Adler, supra note 195, at 584–89; Subotnik, supra note 46, at 971.

353

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
353, 354 (2007).

354

See supra notes 47, 51–52 and accompanying text.

355

This may be most relevant to lesser known or lesser resourced artists who
may need to protect or defend their work against those who use the
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objective assessment of the artist’s intent at the time of creation may allow for such
guidance.356 Artists would be forewarned that self-serving statements alone will
not be sufficient–although their stated intentions, especially if they are
contemporaneous with creation, may be considered. Even if the appropriation
artist has a stated intention, however, the objective manifestation of the artist’s
intent may not be coextensive and should be the key assessment. The court should
place the burden on the secondary user to produce evidence from the time of
creation, including full details of related art pieces and the creation process. By
utilizing evidence from the time of creation, as with contracts, this may encourage
artists to create more contemporaneous records, give guidance as to what kind of
information will assist a claim of fair use, and may even foster pre-appropriation
communication between the original work artist and the appropriation artist.
For example, the name given to the art piece or the show for which a
particular piece was created may give guidance as to the artist’s intention. The
name of Koons’ show in the Rogers case, Banality Show, is helpful in ascertaining
Koons’ intention in creating his art pieces. 357 There may have been other
contemporaneous evidence of artistic intent, such as the theme and cohesiveness
of the planned show, information on how the artist developed the show’s theme,
what the artist’s search strategy for raw materials was, how the artist found the
original work, and the like. Art experts may be useful at this point as well as long
as their opinions are not used to ascribe meaning to the artwork. Such evidence
allows the court to assess whether the intended purpose was transformative
without forcing or relying upon the appropriation artist’s stated intent.
Additionally, courts must also be more cautious in considering
transformativeness as a spectrum, like creativity, rather than a dichotomous choice
between transformation and reproduction. Rather than deeming a work to be
transformative, courts should consider how transformative the work is and use
that degree of transformativeness to weigh whether and how much the first factor
weighs in favor or against fair use.358

copyright regime more regularly. See generally Subotnik, supra note 46, at
962–63.
356

See e.g., Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 279 (Md. 1952)
(using the objective intent to be bound for contract formation).

357

See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
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See Heymann, supra note 336, at 449 (observing this in the context of using
the reader response rather than the artist’s intent).
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Because the fair use analysis is intended to be flexible, all uncertainty
cannot be eliminated. 359 The trier of fact must make its decision on a case-by-case
basis regarding whether the evidence is sufficient such that the transformative
consideration should weigh in favor of the secondary user. 360 But considering
objective evidence of artistic intent (and subjective statements contemporaneous
to creation to the extent they are otherwise supported) may provide better
guidance to artists as they consider new works and therefore, makes it less likely
that artists will chill creative expression out of fear of the unknown or of failing to
achieve what an audience would perceived as new expression.361
C.

FUNGIBILITY BALANCES THE TRANSFORMATIVE CONSIDERATION

There is one final consideration to add to the first factor of fair use:
fungibility. 362 At its heart, transformativeness approaches the question of the
public benefit, namely, whether the exclusive rights of the copyright regime must
be relaxed to foster new creative works. 363 Even putting aside the interests
reflected in the other fair use factors, something is still missing. None of it answers
the question of whether the secondary user needed to use the copyright protected
work to create the secondary work. Logically, courts may want to stay away from
this type of evaluation because it seems to invade the creative process too much.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has warned against secondary uses that are
simply to obtain attention or avoid drudgery. 364 Transformativeness does not
really address the drudgery question, but a fungibility assessment may do so.
Questions surrounding the first fair use factor are often posed as assessing
when it is appropriate for an artist to use another artist’s copyrighted work as raw
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See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
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See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 46, at 973–74.
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Often used in the context of contracts, fungible is defined as “[c]ommercially
interchangeable with other property of the same kind.” Fungible, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In the context of this Article, fungibility
refers to interchangeability, specifically when different works are
interchangeable to achieve the same goals.

363

See supra notes 3, 7–10 and accompanying text.

364

See also Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014)
(noting that fair use is not to protect lazy appropriation but rather to
facilitate uses that would not always be possible if licenses were required).
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materials or as the foundation of a new work. 365 In fact, this “raw-material
paradigm” ignores the fundamental, appropriate reason for using preexisting
images, namely, when the underlying copyrighted works are “so deeply infused
with meaning that they can provide opportunities for personal development or
broader cultural dialogue.”366
In even broader terms, the original work should have unique
characteristics that are useful to the creation of the secondary work. The more the
characteristics of the original work are fungible for the purposes of the secondary
user, the less likely the secondary user should have a claim to fair use. While this
assessment should tack back to the objective evidence of artistic intent, the focus
is not on the finished product but on the reasons why the original work was
needed to produce the finished product. Notably, however, fungibility would not
be dispositive or even presumptively determinative. As with transformativeness,
fungibility would be assessed on a spectrum rather than a simple yes or no
determination. And as with transformativeness, it would simply be a
consideration to guide the court in evaluating the ultimate question—should this
use be considered fair in order to further the goals of copyright law? 367
Consider the Cariou case. At one point, Prince noted that he was looking
for very factual representations of Rastafarians, 368 suggesting that any factual
depiction of Rastafarians would suffice. Factual pictures of Rastafarians would
have been interchangeable for his purposes. If he chose Cariou’s photographs
simply to avoid costs, such as the costs of taking his own photographs, paying
Cariou or another photographer for a license, or identifying works in the public
domain, then this fungibility inquiry indicates a high degree of fungibility and
more heavily weighs against fair use. The copyright owner’s rights do not need to
be diminished to allow for the creative endeavor of the second user.
365

United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). It cannot be solely because the art world has recognized appropriation
art as a form of art. “The fact that the infringing copy can be classified as
‘art’ or as being part of an ‘artistic tradition’ cannot be used as a shield to
salvage an otherwise defective fair use defense.” Id.
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Gilden, supra note 257, at 357.

367

See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759–60 (noting that there was no need for the
secondary artist to take the original photograph, as opposed to other
photographs of the same politician; the Seventh Circuit still found fair use
appropriate, determining that “by the time the defendants were done,
almost none of the copyrighted work remained,” perhaps largely influenced
by the third factor analysis).
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See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Without a fungibility check, appropriation artists may be simply avoiding
the “drudgery”369 of finding non-infringing raw materials or creating their own
raw materials. One consequence may be that further enabling wealthy artists to
simply take the work of other, lesser known artists without paying for a license.370
As with transformativeness, the assessment should be inextricably tied to
objective manifestations of artistic intent. At the same time, fungibility would not
be a redundant inquiry. Instead, fungibility should act to refocus the court on the
overall copyright scheme. If the exclusive rights do not have the fair use safety
valve, then important expression is chilled.371 But if the safety valve is too loose,
then the exclusive rights have little chance to incentivize creativity. Fungibility
reminds the court to consider whether the appropriation artist really had any
reasonable, non-infringing alternatives. It serves to make sure that the safety value
is neither too tight nor too loose.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is true that “every new artistic work borrows from, or stands on the
shoulders of, the art work that came before it.”372 Simply because appropriation
art is recognized as an art form, however, does not mean that it must a fortiori be
protected by the fair use doctrine. To avoid copyright infringement, the focus must
be on whether fair use is a necessary release value to avoid chilling creative works
or whether allowing fair use would discourage other artists from making their
creative works.
Unfortunately, the current transformativeness test, when used in the
context of visual art, fails to strike the right balance. As adopted by courts,
transformativeness has been given too powerful a role and has no clear mechanism
for determining meaning. Additionally, the spectrum between reproduction and
transformativeness has been subsumed into a simple dichotomous evaluation as
to whether the work is transformative or not. Most importantly, when the original
work used as “raw materials” is easily interchangeable with other work or
obtainable by the second artist without using anyone else’s copyright protected
369

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).

370

See, e.g., David Newhoff, Graham v. Prince or Art v. Fair Use, ILLUSION OF
MORE (Oct. 17, 2018), https://illusionofmore.com/graham-v-prince-or-art-vfair-use [https://perma.cc/HB4D-BPXR] (arguing that the real transformation
was simply the Richard Prince branding).

371

See supra notes 47, 51–52 and accompanying text.
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v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)).
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material, it is not clear why the copyright rights of the first artist should be
diminished. Instead, a rebalanced fair use analysis, with an appropriate
transformativeness and fungibility assessment, should help protect all artists’
rights—even though nothing could solve all the ambiguity or uncertainty inherent
in fair use.

